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notice to the public that they may suc-
cessfully sue a state official for the 
deprivation of their federal rights, 
whether the official was acting in ac-
cordance with the state's laws or in 
abuse of them. Hafer sends a message 
to public officials who do not enjoy 
absolute immunity that they will be 
held personally accountable for de-
priving citizens oftheir federal rights, 
regardless of the nature of officials' 
actions. With the cautionary signal 
that the Supreme Court is sending 
through Hafer, state officials must 
make less arbitrary, and more thought-
ful decisions or else be held account-
able to the public they serve. 
- Kenneth J. Goldsmith 
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. 
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources: 
WASTE IMPORT RESTRIC-
TIONS VIOLATE INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE. 
In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, 
Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Re-
sources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992), the 
United States Supreme Court held that 
because solid waste is constitutionally 
protected as an article of commerce, 
any regulation imposed upon the move-
ment of solid waste must withstand 
strict scrutiny under the Commerce 
Clause ofthe United States Constitu-
tion. The Court found that the waste 
import restrictions ofMichigan's Solid 
Waste Management Act ("SWMA") 
were economically protectionist and, 
thus, in violation of the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. 
Two provisions implementing 
waste import restrictions were adopted 
in 1988 when Michigan's SWMA was 
amended. Section 299.413a prohib-
ited the disposal of solid waste from 
other counties and states in any county 
in Michigan. However, waste could be 
imported into a county ifthat county's 
solid waste management plan explic-
itly authorized the importation of out-
of -county waste. Fort Gratiot Sanitary 
Landfill (''Fort Gratiof') applied to the 
St. Clair County Solid Waste Planning 
Committee ("Committee") in 1989 for 
approval to accept out-of-state waste. 
Even though Fort Gratiot promised to 
reserve space for waste generated within 
the county, the Committee denied the 
application because the county's solid 
waste management plan did not autho-
rize the acceptance of waste originat-
ing outside the county. 
Fort Gratiot contested the decision, 
charging that Michigan's 1988 SWMA 
waste import restrictions were uncon-
stitutional because they authorized the 
counties to prevent privately owned 
operations from participating in inter-
state commerce. The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan held that there was no 
fucial discrimination because the county 
plan did not treat states any worse than 
other counties in Michigan. The dis-
trict court noted that each county had 
the option of disallowing waste gener-
ated from outside the county to enter 
county landfills and, therefore, the stat-
ute did not place an outright ban on 
out-of-state waste. Based upon their 
analysis of Michigan's SWMA, the 
district court dismissed Fort Gratiot's 
complaint. The Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit agreed with the dis-
trictcourt'sreasoningandaifmnedthe 
decision. The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine 
the SWMA's constitutionality. The 
Supreme Court rejected the state court's 
analysis that solid waste had no consti-
tutional protection because it was val-
ueless. Id. at 2022. The Court rea-
soned that ''whether the business ar-
rangements between out-of-state gen-
erators of waste and the Michigan op-
eratorof a waste disposal site are viewed 
as "sales" of garbage or ''purchases'' of 
transportation and disposal services, 
the commercial transactions unques-
tionably have an interstate character." 
Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023. Re-
lying on Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
in which a New Jersey law prohibiting 
the importation of out of state waste 
was struck down as violative of the 
Commerce Clause, the Court stated 
that although solid waste has no value, 
it is an article of commerce and, there-
fore, the interstate movement of solid 
waste is regulated by the Commerce 
Clause. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 
2023 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jer-
sey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978». 
Michigan and St. Clair County at-
tempted to circumvent the application 
of the Commerce Clause by distin-
guishing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
because there, the prohibition was 
placed only upon out-of-state waste. 
Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024. They 
argued that Michigan's SWMA did 
not place an unreasonable burden upon 
interstate commerce because the re-
strictions treated states and other Michi-
gan counties in a similar manner. Id. 
The Court, however, disagreed with 
this argument and declared that "a bur-
den imposed by a State upon interstate 
commerce is not to be sustained sim-
ply because the statute imposing it 
applies alike to the people of all the 
States, including the people ofthe State 
enacting such statute." Fort Gratiot, 
112 S. Ct. at 2025 (quoting Brimmerv. 
Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1891». 
The Court declared that it was im-
material that other counties in Michi-
gan had adopted separate plans which 
allowed the importation of out-of-
county waste. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2025. The discretion given to the 
counties by the SWMA amendments 
was deemed not to exempt the statute 
from scrutiny under the Commerce 
Clause. Id. at 2025-26. As in 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, where a 
New Jersey statute gave a state agency 
the permission to import certain cat-
egories of waste, the Court in Fort 
Gratiot held that Michigan's authori-
zation for counties to accept out-of-
county waste ''merely reduced the scope 
of the discrimination," but it did not 
cure the discriminatory effect upon 
interstate commerce. Fort Gratiot, 
112 S. Ct. at 2025. 
The Court noted that under the 
Commerce Clause, a state statute that 
discriminates against interstate com-
merce is unconstitutional "unless the 
discrimination is demonstrably justi-
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fied by a valid factor unrelated to ec0-
nomic protectionism." Id. at 2024 
(quoting New Energy Co. of Indiana v. 
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988». 
Michigan and St. Clair County claimed 
that the amendments were not eco-
nomically motivated~ rather, they were 
intended to protect the health and safety 
of the citizens. ForlGratiol, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2026. The Court explained that 
"because [the] provisions unambigu-
ously discriminate against interstate 
commerce, the State bears the burden 
of proving that they further health and 
safety concerns that cannot be ad-
equately served by nondiscriminatory 
alternatives." Fori Gratiol, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2027. In Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 
131 (1986), the Court upheld Maine's 
ban on the importation of live baitfish 
because of parasites and other prob-
lems the nonnative baitfish posed. The 
Court concluded that Michigan's Waste 
Import Restrictions violated the Com-
merce Clause because the amendments 
failed to present a reason, apart from 
origin, why solid waste from outside 
the county should be treated differ-
ently from solid waste from inside the 
county. Fori Gratiol, 112 S. Ct. at 
2027-28. 
The Court stressed that even if a 
legitimate goal were sought, illegiti-
mate means to achieve that goal may 
not be used. Id at 2027. Michiganand 
St. Clair County asserted that the re-
strictions were needed to allow coun-
ties to adequately plan for the safe 
disposal offuture waste. Fort Gratiot, 
112 S. Ct. at 2027. The Court ac-
knowledged that "although accurate 
forecasts may be an indispensable part 
of a comprehensive waste disposal plan, 
Michigan could attain that objective 
without discriminating between in- and 
out-of-state waste." Id at 2027. 
In his dissent, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist argued that the case should 
be remanded for consideration of 
whether the SWMA amendments were 
based upon legitimate local health and 
safetyconcerns.Id. at2028. TheChief 
Justice asserted that in light of the 
problems associated with the disposal 
of waste, Michigan was taking reason-
able measures to protect its citizens and 
was not constructing a form of ec0-
nomic protectionism. Id at 2028-29. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist declared, "the 
Cou rt today penalizes the State ofMichi-
gan for what to all appearances are its 
good-faith efforts, in tum encouraging 
each State to ignore the waste problem 
in the hope that another will pick up the 
slack." Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 
2031. 
In Fori Gratiol, the Court imposed 
a strict standard against the implemen-
tation of discriminatory waste import 
laws. The Court will strike down any 
statute that interferes with interstate 
commerce, unless a state can show that 
the restrictions were nece~sary to pro-
tect its citizens and that there were no 
less discriminatory options. In order 
for states or counties to enforce a waste 
management plan, the area that is to be 
protected must be held to the same 
standards that are imposed upon other 
counties and states. 
- Carol Nakhuda Cohen 
In re Criminal Investigation No. Jf 
242Q: ATTORNEY -CLIENT FEE 
RECORDS NOT PRIVILEGED 
FROM SUBPOENA. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
recently held that requiring an attorney 
to disclose jury records ofthe fees paid 
by two former clients to a grand jury did 
not violate the attorney-client privi-
lege. In re Criminal Investigation No. 
Jl242Q, 326 Md. 1, 602 A.2d 1220 
(1992). The court emphasized that 
although Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules 
of Professional Responsibility, govern-
ing confidentiality, is broader than the 
attorney-client privilege rule in Mary-
land, it does not provide an absolute 
shield to prevent this information from 
being subpoenaed. 
As part of an investigation of known 
or suspected narcotics traffickers, the 
state routinely sought evidence of vio-
lations of the state income tax laws. 
The growing trend in narcotics investi-
gation was to seek evidence of expendi-
tures of large sums of money, includ-
ing attorney's fees, as a means of 
interpolating the net worth of a sus-
pect. For this reason, the Grand Jury 
for Anne Arundel County issued a 
subpoena duces tecum to attorney Wil-
liam H. Murphy, Jr. for the fee records 
of two of his former clients. 
In a motion to quash the subpoena, 
Mr. Murphy pleaded that he had ex-
pressly promised his clients that all 
information about fees "would be per-
sonal, privileged, and confidential 
because of, among other things, the 
growing practice of prosecutors na-
tionwide to use such information to 
establish violations of the narcotics 
laws .... " Id. at 6,602 A.2dat 1222. 
He argued that to reveal the informa-
tion in light of his client's express 
request that he not, was a breach of 
confidentiality . 
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 
County granted the motion to quash 
the subpoena on the grounds that ''the 
Maryland Rules of Professional Con-
duct have 'enlarged the general prin-
ciple of confidentiality. '" Id. at 3,602 
A.2d at 1221. On behalf of the grand 
jury, the State filed an appeal to the 
court of special appeals. Before the 
intermediate court heard the case, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
. land granted certiorari and reversed 
the circuit court's decision, holding 
that Rule 1.6 and the judicial applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege 
rule are distinct concepts. The court 
found that Rule 1.6 does not enlarge 
the attorney-client privilege rule in 
Maryland. 
The court of appeals began by ana-
lyzing Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Citing the 
prefatory material to the Rules, which 
stated: "Moreover, these Rules are not 
intended to govern or affect judicial 
application of either the attorney-cli-
ent or work product privilege, the court 
rejected the lower court's contention 
that the adoption of this rule by the 
Maryland legislature affectively ex-
panded the attorney-client privilege." 
Id at 4, 602 A.2d at 1221 (quoting 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
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